

VZCZCXR07927
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0501/01 3031111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291111Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6546
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0494

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000501

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2118

TAGS: PREL PREF MARR KPKO PINR PGOV UN SU CD

SUBJECT: SRSG BRIEFS ON MINURCAT II AND GROWING INSTABILITY
IN EASTERN CHAD CAUSED BY ZAGHAWA &DEPREDATIONS8

REF: A. A) NDJAMENA 500
 1B. B) NDJAMENA 491

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Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4(B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY

11. (C) SRSG Victor Angelo told AMB and DCM Oct 28 that his negotiations with the GOC regarding the composition and mandate for a reinforced MINURCAT II were progressing satisfactorily, but that he still needed to convince some in UN HQ in New York regarding his own conception of the reconfigured PKO, especially a tripartite security wing composed of police trainer element; a traditional military element; and gendarmerie-like element. SRSG reported that UNDPKO wants a military element of 6,000 troops, but that the GOC has balked at agreeing to more than 3,000 UN military. Angelo said he could live with a military element of 4,500-4,750, which he believes he can convince the GOC to agree to.

12. (C) The SRSG indicated concern over developments in Eastern Chad, saying that the refugee camps were "deeply politicized," especially those with sizeable Zaghawa populations, where JEM combatants and recruiters are located. The SRSG also discerned negative Chadian Zaghawa influence growing in eastern Chad, where ethnic Zaghawa &depredations8 disaffect other ethnic groups and drive many into Sudan and rebel activity there. The SRSG said that tensions are rising between neighboring communities over scarce resources and that within many communities ethnic differences could explode into conflict, again over scarce resources. The SRSG also expressed concern over Libya's strenuous diplomatic activity regarding the Chad-Sudan conflict, saying that he thought much of the urgency with which Libya was acting could be explained by Tripoli's desire to keep the reinforced MINURCAT II as small as possible, especially regarding its military component. SRSG speculated on President Deby's health, saying that he had noticed in meetings that Deby often spoke "haltingly and laboriously," but that he seemed to summon strength for infrequent, but highly orchestrated public appearances, he appears normal, if not energetic. END SUMMARY.

MINURCAT II

13. (C) SRSG Victor Angelo told AMB and DCM Oct 28 that his negotiations with the GOC regarding the composition and mandate for a reinforced MINURCAT II were progressing satisfactorily, but that he still needed to convince some in UN HQ in New York regarding his own conception of the

reconfigured PKO. SRSG repeated that he wanted a tripartite security wing composed of a police trainer element to continue to train and mentor Chadian police and gendarmes who form the integrated security detachments (DIS) to provide internal security to the refugee camps; a traditional military element to provide security outside the camps; and a gendarmerie-like element to provide security to zones where humanitarian workers live and to and from those zones.

GOC HESITANCY

¶4. (C) SRSG reported that the GOC says that a traditional military element is "indispensable" and wants the operational capacity of those UN military increased but has balked at agreeing to more than 3,000 UN military, which does not conduce to increased capacity. UNDPKO in New York, according to SRSG, wants 6,000 UN military, which Angelo believes is excessive. Angelo would be happy with a military element of 4,500 to 4,750, which he believes he can convince the GOC to agree to.

5.(C) The GOC has also indicated that it will not look favorably on inclusion of military and gendarmes from "Arab countries" in MINURCAT II and has hinted at a request to see a list of force-contributing countries, which Angelo finds disquieting and far too reminiscent of the Sudan government's approach to UNAMID in Darfur. The SRSG, however, believes that the GOC has displayed some flexibility and can be convinced to do the right thing.

EASTERN CHAD: THE ZAGHAWA PROBLEM

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¶6. (C) Regarding the situation in eastern Chad, the SRSG was less upbeat. He sees many of the refugee camps as "deeply politicized," especially those with sizeable Zaghawa populations, where JEM combatants take their & rest and recreation⁸, and where JEM recruiters are active. Parallel to this mostly negative Sudanese Zaghawa influence in the camps, SRSG sees negative Chadian Zaghawa influence growing in eastern Chad, as members of President Deby's ethnic group take advantage of official and non-official positions and connections to make economic gains at the expense of other ethnic groups. This feeds the Chad rebel groups in Sudan. As an example, SRSG said that the Guereda secondary school was almost empty, as younger non-Zaghawa locals have crossed over to Sudan to escape Zaghawa depredations.

ETHNIC AND COMMUNITARIAN TENSIONS

¶7. (C) SRSG said that tensions are rising between neighboring communities over scarce resources and that within many communities ethnic differences could explode into conflict, again over scarce resources. SRSG said that Zaghawa "predatory practices" were apparent in the south of Chad as well as in the capital and eastern Chad, as Zaghawas with official civil and military positions use their clout for economic gain for themselves and their families. SRSG said he doubted that the recent wholesale replacement of governors, prefects and other local administrative officials was designed to actually improve delivery of administrative services and reduce corruption and other b^{uses}.

LIBYA AND MINURCAT II

¶8. (C) The SRSG noted the Libyan-inspired & tripartite⁸ meeting in Tripoli that brought Chadian and Sudanese

diplomats together and promised reestablishment of relations between N,Djamena and Khartoum. Angelo mentioned that Libya was planning to fly a Chadian Ambassador to Khartoum and a Sudanese Ambassador to N,Djamena and was strongly pushing the idea of a border observation force to reduce tensions between Chad and Sudan. The SRSG also expressed concern over Libya,s strenuous diplomatic activity regarding the Chad-Sudan conflict, saying that he thought much of the urgency with which Libya was acting could be explained by Tripoli,s desire to keep the reinforced MINURCAT II as small as possible, especially regarding its military component. The border observation force idea, even if it never materialized, was useful to Tripoli in its effort to keep UN PKO troop numbers in Chad as low as possible.

PRES DEBY,S HEALTH

¶9. (C) SRSG speculated on the health of President Deby, saying that he had noticed in meetings that Deby often spoke "haltingly and laboriously," indicating a lack of strength. Even so, he seemed to summon strength for highly orchestrated public appearances)- once a week or so -- where he appears normal, if not energetic.

COMMENT

¶10. (C) We continue to think that Angelo,s vision for MINURCAT II is the right one. We will take his concerns over the situation in eastern Chad into account as we look at prospects for future progress there. Chadian monkeying with UN PKO proposals is not unexpected. The UN presence will be massive and the GOC leadership wants to ensure that it does not thwart its political objectives, i.e., resistance to Chadian rebels and continued support for JEM. Regarding the size of the projected force, Chadians have little appreciation for the required logistic tail. Also, the ANT has its eyes on some of the EUFOR infrastructure, and believes that the time to get it is during the changeover. In the end, however, we share the SRSG's view that the GOC will come around to endorse mutually accepted force structure and mandate.

NIGRO